Password-based user-authentication schemes have been widely used when users access a server to avail internet services. Multiserver password-authentication schemes enable remote users to obtain service from multiple servers without separately registering with each server. In 2008, Jia-Lun Tsai proposed an improved and efficient password-authenticated key agreement scheme for a multiserver architecture based on Chang-Lee's scheme proposed in 2004. However, we found that Tsai's scheme does not provide forward secrecy and is weak to insider impersonation and denial of service attacks. In this article, we describe the drawbacks of Tsai's scheme and provide a countermeasure to satisfy the forward secrecy property.
Introduction
Password authentication is one of the simplest and most convenient authentication mechanisms followed over public networks. Conventional password-authentication schemes are suitable for solving the privacy and security problems of a single user operating under a client-server architecture. As the network becomes larger, the password-authentication schemes that only support a single server are clearly not sufficient to address the users' growing needs. Therefore, many dynamic password-authentication schemes have been proposed for the multiserver architecture [1∼5] . In the multiserver architecture, there are two types of servers-the service server and the control server. The service server is a public server that allows all legitimate users to access the network, whereas the control server is a private back end server, which is not disclosed. Multiserver password-authentication schemes enable remote users with a single password to access multiple servers without separately registering with each server. In addition, most of them provide an added functionality to derive a session key (SK), such as an encryption key or a message authentication code (MAC) key, for each session, particularly for subsequent secure communication use, to protect the messages transmitted during each session. These schemes are therefore referred to as password-authenticated key agreement protocols.
In 2004, Juang proposed a password-authenticated key agreement scheme for a multiserver architecture using symmetric encryption methods without the need for a verification table [3] . However, Juang's scheme lacks efficiency, and each server needs to additionally protect and securely maintain an encrypted key table. In the same year, Chang and Lee proposed a similar but more efficient and secure scheme using symmetric encryption [1] . Their scheme is claimed to be able to achieve the following six vital requirements of the multiserver passwordauthentication scheme: choose and change password at will; less computation; security; mutual authentication; single registration; SK agreement. However Chang-Lee's scheme assumes that the registration centre(RC) and all the service servers are trustworthy and that the RC sends each server a shared secret key through a secure channel. This assumption is not practical because the service server is a public domain and thus is the major target of the adversary. Moreover, sharing of the secret key between the RC and the service server facilitates impersonation of each other. In 2007, Tsai proposed a password-authenticated key agreement scheme for a multiserver architecture using hash functions without the need for a verification table [6] . Tsai's scheme assumes that only the RC is trustworthy. This assumption is more practical because the service server is open to all legitimate users, but the control server is maintained private in the back end. However, we find that Tsai's scheme does not provide for forward secrecy under its assumption, and some potential threats to the scheme have been negligently unexplored in the corresponding security analysis. In this study, we will analyze these issues in detail.
The structure of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we will recapitulate Tsai's multiserver password-authenticated key agreement scheme using smart cards. In section 3, we will discuss a few cryptographic flaws of Tsai's schemes and provide a countermeasure to satisfy the forward secrecy property. In the last section, we will conclude this article.
Review of Tsai's Scheme
The main notations used throughout this article are listed as follows. This subsection reviews Tsai's multiserver password-authenticated key agreement scheme [2] . Tsai's scheme consists of 4 phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication-server and RC phase, and authentication-server and user phase. The details of these phases can be described as follows.
Registration phase
Step R1. to the RC through a secure channel.
Step R2. 
Then, the RC successfully issues a smart cards containing information
Login phase
Step L1. i U inserts the smart card into a card reader and enters his/her identity i U ID and password i U PW to request access to the server j S .
Step L2. 
(3) The reader sends i U ID and 1 C to the server j S .
Authentication-server and RC phase
Step SR1. , and 2 C to the RC.
Step SR2. 
3
C is then sent to j S .
Step SR3. It sends 4 C to the RC.
Step SR4. 
If Eq. (7) does not hold, j S is legal, and the following steps are processed. If they are not equal, j S is not legal, and RC terminates the session.
Step SR5. and next computes 5 C and 6 C as follows:
It sends 5 C and 6 C to j S .
Step SR6. 
If Eq. (10) does not hold, j S terminates the session. If yes, j S proceeds to the next phase.
Authentication-server and user phase
Step SU1. S must obtain the user -authentication key. j S computes 7 C as follows;
(11) and generates a random nonce V as shown below; It sends 2 V and 9 C to i U
Step SU2. , and
It also computes Step SU3. and sends it to j S .
Step SU4. 
If it does not hold, j S aborts. If it holds, j S computes the SK ) 3 || 2 || 1 (
i U also can computes the SK 
The SK is applied for the encryption of all ensuing communications between j S and i U .
Weaknesses

Weakness to Forward Secrecy.
Provision of the forward-secrecy property by a password-based authenticated key agreement protocol is of the utmost importance for avoiding past SKs from being recovered by the compromise of any participating entity's long-term secret key. Tsai's scheme assumes that only the RC is trustworthy. The service server, which is open to all legitimate users, can be penetrated through various means, such as hackers, viruses, worms, misconfigurations, and disgruntled system administrators. Therefore, assuming that the adversary can obtain the service server's long-term authentication key,
, is entirely reasonable.
Let us assume that an adversary has acquired a set of transaction messages of the previous session and the service server's long-term authentication key (5), (9) and (13), respectively, and 8 C using Eqs. (3) and (11) . Now, the adversary can compute the SK of the previous session with the knowledge obtained from the derived information { 7 C , 8 C ,
Countermeasure. From our experience, we can say that forward secrecy in a key agreement protocol cannot be achieved using only the hash function and symmetric encryption schemes. We need to use public-key techniques (e.g., exponentiations in a multiplicative group).
An efficient approach to the preservation of the forward-secrecy property is to slightly modify the protocol specification. Instead of choosing r . Intuitively, the secrecy of the SK and the security of the scheme can be significantly preserved.
Insider impersonation attack
Tsai's scheme does not check the freshness of the nonce. Exploiting this fault, an adversary can impersonate as a legal user. Let us assume that an adversary has acquired a service server's long-term authentication key U from the previous session to login. Because the adversary has the service server's long-term authentication key, he/she can pass the authentication-server and RC phase and generate a legal response 10 C in the authentication-server and user phase. Finally, the adversary agrees to a new SK represented as follows:
Hence, we can easily deduce that Tsai's scheme cannot withstand Insider impersonation attack also.
Denial of service attack
In the specification for Tsai's protocol, the server and RC do not check whether the login request is legal until the session reaches the Step SU3 of the authentication-server and user phase. The adversary can launch denial of service (DoS) attacks by just sending login messages { i U ID , A C 1 }, where A C 1 is an arbitrary nonce chosen by the adversary. The adversary can deprive both the service server and the RC of computing power without incurring any cost except that of sending a message.
Conclusion
We have recapitulated the security features of Tsai's password-authenticated key agreement scheme. Particularly, we have pointed out the absence of the forward secrecy property and provided a countermeasure to satisfy the forward-secrecy property. In addition, we have further highlighted the threats possible due to KCI and DoS attacks. We hope that our discussion will provide adequate awareness to protocol designers for contemplating appropriate security considerations while designing future password-authenticated key agreement schemes to preclude the above-discussed vulnerabilities.
